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UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP
V. EPA:
A SHOT ACROSS THE BOW OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
AMANDA C. LEITER
INTRODUCTION
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection
1
Agency (UARG), decided in June of this year, the Supreme Court
reached a split decision on a pressing but arcane issue related to the
scope of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) authority to
regulate greenhouse gases. From the bench, Justice Scalia described
his opinion for a shifting majority of the Court as, in essence, a win for
the agency: “‘EPA is getting almost everything it wanted in this case,’”
2
he said. “‘[The agency] sought to regulate sources it said were
responsible for 86 percent of all the greenhouse gases emitted from
stationary sources nationwide. Under our holdings, [it] will be able to
3
regulate sources responsible for 83 percent of those emissions.’”
Some in the press accepted Scalia’s characterization, while others
emphasized the partial nature of the victory. Sample headlines include
4
Justices Uphold Emission Limits on Big Industry and Supreme Court
5
Upholds Rules Curbing Greenhouse Gases from Power Plants, but
6
also Supreme Court Limits Greenhouse Gas Regulations.
Copyright © 2014 Amanda C. Leiter.
 Associate Professor of Law, AU Washington College of Law. Many thanks to Dean Claudio
Grossman and the American University Washington College of Law for generously supporting
my work. Thanks also to Jennifer Daskal, Hannah Kaplan, Rob Kelsey, Drew Lavine, Ben Leff,
Jennifer Mueller, Justin Pidot, and Sambhav Sankar for, in varying measures, terrific research
assistance, sound advice, good edits, and honest critiques.
1. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) [hereinafter UARG].
2. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA Can Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, with
Some Limits, WASH. POST, June 24, 2014, at A1 (quoting Justice Scalia’s bench statement).
3. Id.
4. Adam Liptak, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2014, at A1.
5. David G. Savage, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2014, at A1.
6. Richard Wolf, USA TODAY, June 23, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/06/23/supreme-court-greenhouse-gas/8567453/.
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The first two headlines are more accurate than the third. The
trajectory of the UARG case, and the opinion itself, preserve (even
bolster) EPA’s authority to curb greenhouse gas emissions from the
largest industrial sources. That outcome should be welcomed by
anyone concerned about mitigating the serious environmental, public
health, and national security risks of global climate change.
That said, other aspects of the UARG opinion should trouble
anyone concerned about Supreme Court jurisprudence or judicial
deference to agency authority. For one thing, the stakes in statutory
interpretation cases such as UARG are quite high at present, because
our deeply divided Congress seems less likely than past Congresses to
7
8
“intervene[] to correct . . . wayward” Supreme Court interpretations.
Yet part of the UARG decision plays fast-and-loose with the statutory
text, throwing interpretive caution to the winds.
Another portion of the opinion creates a presumption against
reading ambiguous statutory text to grant agencies authority that is
9
either “too expansive” or “too expensive.” The problem? There is no
objective way to measure whether a delegation conveys authority that
is overly expansive or overly expensive. Moreover, no such antidelegation presumption previously existed. Indeed, just last year in
City of Arlington v. FCC, Justice Scalia himself invoked the
opposite—and more commonly accepted–rule: “Congress knows to
speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious
10
terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.”

7. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2466 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8. Indeed, the authors of two recent—and divergent—studies of congressional overrides
apparently agree that since at least 1998, Congress’s participation in this important inter-branch
dialogue has declined “dramatically.” Compare Matthew R. Christiansen & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014), (arguing that the 1990s was “the golden age of
overrides, with an unprecedented explosion of statutes resetting statutory policy in important
ways,” but that after 1998, “overrides declined . . . dramatically”), with Richard L. Hasen, End
of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV.
205, 217 (2013) (“[C]ongressional overruling of Supreme Court cases [has] slowed down
dramatically since 1991”).
9. Justin Pidot, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: Climate Litigation and Statutory
Construction, ACSBLOG (June 24, 2014), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/utility-air-regulatorygroup-v-epa-climate-litigation-and-statutory-construction. Pidot’s observation relates to Justice
Scalia’s assertion that the Court “expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444
(2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
10. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (emphasis added).
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Worse, by inventing this previously nonexistent interpretive
presumption, the UARG opinion not only risks misinterpreting
Congress’s intent, but undermines the separation of powers principle
that: “‘Congress, when it [leaves] ambiguity in a statute’ administered
by an agency, ‘underst[ands] that the ambiguity [will] be resolved, first
and foremost, by the agency, and desire[s] the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
11
allows.’”
The Court reminded readers of this very presumption in EPA v.
EME Homer City Generation, issued just two months before UARG:
“[u]nder Chevron, we read Congress’ silence [on a contested matter]
as a delegation of authority to EPA to select from among reasonable
12
options.” Moreover, in City of Arlington, Justice Scalia confirmed
that this principle applies with full force even when—as in UARG—
the statutory ambiguity goes to the scope of the agency’s own
13
authority. Yet the UARG opinion neither defers to the agency’s
reading of the relevant statutory language nor remands the resulting
mess to the agency to try again. Instead, the opinion imposes its own
reading, thereby taking judicial “possess[ion of] whatever degree of
discretion the ambiguity allows.”
In several ways, the opinion also runs afoul of notions of judicial
restraint. Most egregiously, although the Court limited its grant of
certiorari to a single narrow question, the opinion resolves at least
two other questions that the parties had posed but the Court had
declined to review—and that the parties therefore had not briefed.
Further, the opinion fails to give EPA adequate guidance about
appropriate next steps. Portions of the challenged regulations are
invalid, but it is not clear whether the remaining portions can be
salvaged, or whether the agency must return to its rulemaking
drawing board.
In short, the UARG opinion muddles previously well-understood
principles of statutory interpretation and undermines agency
authority, and it also reaches out to decide or comment on, issues that
were not properly before the Court. The press may have had some
difficulty identifying a clear winner in this case, but the clear losers
are the Court and the administrative state.

11. Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740–741 (1996)).
12. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1604 (2014).
13. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (parenthetical needed).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Setting the Scene
To understand the outcome of UARG and see the shortcomings of
the Court’s opinion, one must have some background on relevant
14
portions of the Clean Air Act. As passed in 1970 and amended
15
several times since then, the Act gives both EPA and the states a role
in reducing air pollution. Specifically, EPA sets national air quality
standards for a set of common pollutants (dubbed “criteria
16
pollutants”): particulate matter, ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur
17
oxides, nitrogen oxides, and lead. This list does not currently include
18
the most common greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide. The Act then
turns over much of the responsibility for achieving and maintaining
these national standards to the states, which must develop
implementation plans identifying the specific emissions control
19
requirements on which each state plans to rely.
Superimposed on that broad structure are several narrower
programs to control emissions of a variety of air pollutants, including
but not limited to the six criteria pollutants listed above. Three such
20
programs are relevant here:
 The Tailpipe Program: A broad federal program to regulate the
tailpipe emissions of any air pollutant that the EPA Administrator
determines contributes to air pollution that “may reasonably be
21
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”;
14. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671 (West 2014).
15. Clean Air Act §§ 101–618, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7642 (West 2014), amended by 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7402–7671g (West 2014).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7408–7409 (West 2014).
17. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS),
EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last updated Oct. 21, 2014).
18. The Center for Biological Diversity has, however, petitioned the agency to list carbon
dioxide as a criteria pollutant. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, PETITION TO ESTABLISH
NATIONAL POLLUTION LIMITS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT
(2009),
available
at,
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/
global_warming_litigation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf.
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 2014).
20. To simplify the discussion, this Article ignores Petitioners’ challenge to the Title V
program, focusing instead on their challenge to the PSD permitting program. “Title V generally
does not impose any substantive pollution-control requirements,” instead serving primarily “to
facilitate compliance and enforcement by consolidating into a single document all of a facility’s
obligations under the Act.” UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436 (2014). Moreover, the Court’s analysis
of the legal issues related to the Title V program largely parallels its analysis of the PSD
Program.
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(1) (West 2014).
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22

The Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program: A
permitting scheme for large new stationary (that is, non-mobile)
sources that will emit specific amounts of “any air pollutant”
23
already subject to regulation under the Act, and for large existing
stationary sources that are undertaking major modifications that
will increase their emissions of “any air pollutant” that is already
24
subject to regulation under the Act; and
 The NSPS Program: A regulatory program to reduce emissions
from whole categories of stationary sources that “cause[], or
contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be
25
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
In creating these pollution control programs, Congress did not
attempt to anticipate every air pollution problem that might confront
the country as the economy grew and new industries developed.
Rather, in both the tailpipe and NSPS programs, Congress granted
EPA broad authority to respond to new and newly recognized airpollution problems that the Administrator determines “may
26
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” The
27
agency terms this determination an “endangerment finding.”

22. The PSD Program is actually a sub-programs of the broader “new source review,” or
NSR, permitting program. There is also another sub-program, the so-called nonattainment new
source review, or NNSR, permitting program. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7502(b), 7503. Applicability of the
PSD and NNSR programs depends on the air quality of the region in question. For purposes of
this Paper, the only relevant sub-program is the PSD Program, which applies to (1) those
criteria pollutants whose levels in the relevant area do not exceed the national air quality
standards (or NAAQS), and (2) other pollutants for which there is no NAAQS. See, e.g.,
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
Region
9
Air
Permits,
EPA.GOV,
ENVT’L
http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/permit/psd-public-part.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)
(describing the PSD Program); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,520 (June 3, 2010) (describing the PSD and NNSR
programs and noting that “[t]here is no NAAQS for [carbon dioxide] or any of the other wellmixed [greenhouse gases], nor has EPA proposed any such NAAQS; therefore, unless and until
we take further such action, we do not anticipate that the nonattainment NSR program will
apply to [greenhouse gases]”).To simplify the discussion, the remainder of the Paper discusses
only the PSD Program, ignoring other aspects of the NSR permitting regime.
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475 (describing permitting program); § 7479(1) (defining “major
emitting facility”).
24. Id. at § 7475 (describing permitting program); § 7479(1) (defining “major emitting
facility”); § 7479(2)(C) (defining “construction”).
25. Id. at § 7411(b)(1)(A).
26. Id. at § 7521(a)(1) (motor vehicle emissions); § 7411(b)(1)(A) (stationary sources).
27. See, e.g., Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. Ch. 1) (making such a determination for greenhouse gases).

LEITER 6.1.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

64

7/6/2015 9:06 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 10:1

Further, these various emissions control programs do not operate
in isolation. They are designed—somewhat clumsily—to work in
tandem. The states and the federal government have the authority
and the obligation to regulate major sources of any air pollutant that
the EPA Administrator deems dangerous. In effect, a finding that a
particular pollutant contributes to pollution that poses risks to human
health or welfare triggers a regulatory cascade: EPA must regulate
that pollutant under the Tailpipe and NSPS Programs, which in turn
triggers the source-by-source permitting obligations of the PSD
28
Program.
29
In two decisions that predate UARG, Massachusetts v. EPA and
30
American Electric Power v. Connecticut (AEP), the Supreme Court
recognized that the protections of the Clean Air Act extend to the
increasingly certain and serious risks of climate change. The timeline
is somewhat complicated. In its 2007 decision in Massachusetts, the
Court noted that the Act’s “sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant,’”
clearly and unambiguously “embraces all airborne compounds of
31
whatever stripe,” including greenhouse gases, provided only that the
32
Administrator makes the required “endangerment finding.” In 2009,
the agency responded to Massachusetts by making such a finding, and
33
committing to regulate tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases.
Shortly thereafter in 2010 and 2011, the agency followed through and
released rules regulating the emissions of greenhouse gases from

28. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010) (describing
EPA’s view that the phrase “pollutant subject to regulation” in the statutory language defining
the scope of the PSD Program “means a pollutant subject to a provision in the [Clean Air Act]
or a regulation issued by EPA under the Act that requires actual control of emissions of that
pollutant,” and thus that the PSD Program is triggered whenever “(1) the EPA promulgate[s]
regulations requiring control of a particular pollutants on the basis of considered judgment,
taking into account the applicable criteria in the CAA, or (2) EPA promulgates regulations on
the basis of Congressional mandate that EPA establish controls on emissions of a particular
pollutant, or (3) Congress itself directly imposes actual controls on emissions of a particular
pollutant”).
29. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
30. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
31. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529, 532.
32. Id. at 532–33 (noting that the Clean Air Act expressly conditions EPA action on the
agency’s “formation of a ‘judgment[’] . . . relate[d] to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare’” (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(1))).
33. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. Ch. 1) (finding that greenhouse gases do pose a risk to human health and welfare).

LEITER 6.1.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/6/2015 9:06 AM

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP V. EPA: A SHOT ACROSS THE BOW
34

65

35

cars and trucks. Further, the agency pledged to take the next steps:
regulating greenhouse gases from major stationary sources via the
36
37
PSD permitting program and the NSPS program. Finally, also in
2011, the Supreme Court referenced the agency’s various regulatory
38
actions and commitments when it held in AEP that some
combination of the Clean Air Act itself and the EPA action
authorized by the Act displaced the Respondents’ “federal common
39
law public nuisance claims against carbon-dioxide emitters.” In other
words, the AEP Court identified EPA’s statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources as grounds to
prevent Respondents from pursuing their common law claims against
those emitters.
In sum, the Court issued its UARG decision against a background
understanding that the Clean Air Act grants EPA authority to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions, not only from tailpipes, but also
from stationary industrial sources via the PSD and NSPS programs.
B. The Lead-Up to UARG
The question in UARG concerned the shape and scope of the
agency’s effort to implement the PSD permitting program for
greenhouse gases. Following its longstanding interpretation of the
40
Clean Air Act, EPA took the position that (1) the agency’s

34. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (regulating light duty vehicles).
35. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011) (regulating medium and
heavy duty vehicles); see also Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (regulating
lighter trucks).
36. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010) (determining
that PSD Program requirements apply to greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources as
of the effective date of the tailpipe regulations for greenhouse gas emission from light duty
vehicles).
37. Notice of Proposed Settlement Agreement; Request for Public Comment, 75 Fed.
Reg., 82,392, 82,392 (Dec. 30, 2010) (proposing to reach a settlement agreement in pending D.C.
Circuit litigation, under which EPA would “sign by July 26, 2011 . . . a proposed rule under
[Clean Air Act] section 111(b) that includes standards of performance for [greenhouse gases]
for new and modified [electricity generating units]”); see also Clean Air Act § 111(d)(1), 42
U.S.C.A. § 7411(d)(1) (West 2014) (triggering a requirement that States set standards for
existing sources “to which [an NSPS] standard of performance would apply if such existing
sources were a new source”).
38. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011).
39. Id.
40. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 9–10, UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (No. 12-
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regulation of the tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases automatically
41
triggered the PSD Permitting Program, and (2) the PSD Program, in
turn, obligated both new and modified “major” stationary sources to
obtain greenhouse gas emissions permits, and to comply with the
associated—and fairly rigorous and expensive—emissions control
42
requirements. The agency ran into a significant obstacle, however,
when it confronted the Clean Air Act language defining which
facilities are sufficiently “major” to be covered by the PSD Program.
For greenhouse gases, the language is overbroad.
This overbreadth is not a drafting error. It is a consequence,
rather, of the Clean Air Act’s age and the nature of climate pollution.
When Congress wrote the Act, “the study of climate change was in its
43
infancy.” Congress had in mind more familiar pollutants—
compounds such as sulfur dioxide, emitted as byproducts of
combustion. Drafters targeted the largest industrial sources of those
pollutants but let smaller sources continue to operate without a
permit. Specifically, under the Act, the PSD Program extends only to
“major” stationary sources that emit more than 250—or, for some
44
sources, 100—tons per year of the regulated pollutant.
The 250 and 100 tons-per-year statutory thresholds generally work
well for traditional pollutants. Only the most significant stationary
sources, such as fossil-fuel-fired power plants, emit more than the
threshold amount of criteria pollutants like sulfur dioxide, and thus
find themselves subject to PSD permitting and pollution control
requirements. But the most common greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide,
is not a trace pollutant but the inevitable end product of almost all
1146) [hereinafter Brief for Federal Respondents] (“Since the earliest days of the PSD program,
the EPA has concluded that, once a pollutant becomes regulated under the Act (as greenhouse
gases now are under Title II), two related but distinct consequences follow automatically under
the PSD program. First, going forward, the PSD program [applies to] any stationary source that
emits large quantities of that newly regulated pollutant. . . [and s]econd, all proposed facilities to
which the PSD program applies must take certain steps with respect to that newly regulated
pollutant.”).
41. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010).
42. For example, permitted sources are required to install the “best available control
technology” for all regulated pollutants. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475(a)(4) (West 2014). The statute
elsewhere defines “best available control technology” as “an emission limitation based on the
maximum degree of reduction of each pollutants subject to regulation under this chapter . . .
which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis . . . determines is achievable for such
facility.” Id. at § 7479(3).
43. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007).
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475 (requiring preconstruction permits for “major emitting facilities”);
§ 7479(1) (defining “major emitting facility”).
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combustion. As a result, EPA projected that applying the PSD
thresholds to stationary sources of greenhouse gases would bring tens
45
of thousands of additional sources under the agency’s PSD umbrella,
46
impose hundreds of millions of additional dollars in permitting costs,
and result in “a volume of permit applications that is so high that the
[PSD Program] would become impossible for State and Federal
authorities to administer. The PSD . . . permitting processes would
47
become overwhelmed and essentially paralyzed.”
As a temporary solution to this implementation conundrum, EPA
promulgated something it dubiously nicknamed a “Tailoring Rule.”
This rule purported to elevate by several orders of magnitude the
triggering threshold for application of the PSD Program to
greenhouse gas sources, so as to continue to target only the largest
48
and most egregious sources. EPA emphasized that it did not intend
this “tailoring” of the statutory thresholds to be a permanent solution
but rather a short-term fix—a phase-in of the permitting
49
requirements. Indeed, EPA pledged to conduct future rulemakings
to address greenhouse gas emissions from sources whose emissions
fell between the statutory triggering thresholds and the Tailoring
50
Rule’s elevated thresholds.
This promise of a phase-in did not, however, insulate the Tailoring
Rule (or the rest of EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations) from judicial
challenge. Questioning both the agency’s legal interpretations and its
fact-finding, various industry players and some States challenged
every aspect of EPA’s permitting program for greenhouse gas sources.
Their claims covered everything from the original endangerment
finding, to the Tailpipe Rule for cars and light trucks, to the theory

45. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,295 (proposed Oct. 27. 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70,
& 71) (“[T]o apply the statutory PSD and title V applicability thresholds to sources of GHG
emissions would bring tens of thousands of small sources and modifications into the PSD
Program each year.”).
46. Id. at 55,301 (“[T]he additional annual permitting burden for permitting authorities, on
a national basis, is estimated to be 3.3 million hours at a cost of $257 million to include all
[greenhouse gas] emitters above the 250-[tons-per-year] threshold.”).
47. Id. at 55,311.
48. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,517 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, & 71).
49. Id. at 31,516 (“EPA is establishing with this rulemaking a phase-in approach for [PSD]
applicability, and is establishing the first two steps of the phase-in for the largest emitters of
[greenhouse gases]. We also commit to certain follow-up actions regarding future steps beyond
the first two.”).
50. Id.
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that the Tailpipe Rule triggered application of the PSD Program, and
the details of the resulting Tailoring Rule. In all, challengers filed close
to one hundred cases in the Court of Appeals for the District of
51
Columbia Circuit.
At first, the agency successfully fended off these challenges. The
D.C. Circuit consolidated all of the cases and issued a per curiam
ruling that was very favorable to the agency. Specifically, the court
upheld both the endangerment finding and the Tailpipe Rule for cars
52
and light trucks; agreed with EPA that its regulation of tailpipe
emissions of greenhouse gases triggered PSD obligations for all major
53
stationary sources of those emissions; and concluded that no
petitioner had standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule because its
54
function was “actually [to] mitigate Petitioners’ purported injuries.”
That brings us, finally, to the Supreme Court case. Numerous
challengers sought certiorari from the D.C. Circuit decision, proposing
a broad range of possible “questions presented,” including six that are
relevant to this discussion:
1. Whether the Court should reconsider its 2007 determination in
Massachusetts v. EPA that the Clean Air Act extends to the
55
regulation of greenhouse gases;
2. Whether EPA’s finding that greenhouse gases endanger human
health and welfare was both procedurally and substantively
56
sound;
3. Whether the agency correctly concluded that its regulation of
tailpipe emissions automatically triggered PSD permitting
57
requirements for stationary sources of greenhouse gases;
4. More generally, whether the agency correctly concluded that the
PSD Program applies to major stationary sources of greenhouse

51. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (consolidating cases).
52. Id. at 317.
53. Id. at 340.
54. Id. at 317, 350.
55. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Texas v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (No. 12-1146)
[hereinafter Texas Certiorari Petition]. The petitions for certiorari cited in footnotes 56–61 are
petitions by separate parties in the individual cases consolidated by the Supreme Court to
become the UARG opinion.
56. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Virginia v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (No. 121152).
57. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 134 S.
Ct. 2427 (2014) (No. 12-1272).
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gases, or whether the program should instead be limited only to
58
sources of the six common criteria pollutants;
5. Whether the D.C. Circuit erred in holding that no petitioner had
59
standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule; and finally,
6. Whether the Tailoring Rule violated the Clean Air Act by
rewriting the triggering standards of the PSD Program, and
sharply narrowing its application to stationary sources of
60
greenhouse gases.
Again, though, the agency fared reasonably well. Although the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, it limited its grant to a single, quite
narrow question presented, and its ultimate merits decision was
61
reasonably favorable to the agency.
II. THE UARG DECISION – THREE IMPORTANT VICTORIES FOR THE
AGENCY
A. Victory #1
As noted, EPA’s first victory in connection with the Supreme
Court case came with the Court’s grant of certiorari. Although the
62
Agency opposed certiorari, the narrowness of the grant amounted to
a significant win for EPA. Specifically, as relevant here, the Court
declined to consider questions one through five above, instead
focusing its attention on a single narrow issue, related but not
identical to question six: “[w]hether EPA permissibly determined that
its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
triggered [PSD] permitting requirements . . . for stationary sources
63
that emit greenhouse gases.” In other words, the Court declined
either to reconsider its determination, in Massachusetts v. EPA, that
64
the Clean Air Act extends to greenhouse gases, or to disturb the D.C.
Circuit’s twin holdings that EPA (1) reasonably concluded those gases

58. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Chem. Council v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427
(2014) (No. 12-1248).
59. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct.
2427 (2014) (No. 12-1146).
60. Texas Certiorari Petition, supra note 55, at i.
61. See infra at Part II.
62. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 18, UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427
(2014) (No. 12-1146) [hereinafter Federal Opposition Brief].
63. Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 418, 418 (2013) (order granting
certiorari).
64. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 528–32 (2007).
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contribute to air pollution that endangers human health and welfare;
and (2) followed required procedures and acted reasonably in
66
regulating the tailpipe emissions of those gases. As a result, the case
posed only a narrow and well-cabined risk to EPA’s authority to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions and to the President’s broader
67
climate agenda.
B. Victory #2
The agency’s second victory, too, related to the fate of
Massachusetts v. EPA. Even though the Court declined to accept
certiorari on the question of that case’s continued validity, there
remained a possibility that the four Massachusetts dissenters—Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—would pen or
join opinions expressing their continued skepticism that the Clean Air
Act extends to greenhouse gas emissions. In the end, though, only
68
Justices Thomas and Alito expressed that skepticism, indicating that
“seven of the Justices now view the issues decided in [Massachusetts]
69
as settled.”
C. Victory #3
Explaining the third, more technical agency victory requires some
background on the structure, analysis, and holdings of the Court’s
opinion in UARG. Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, though only two
justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy—agreed with
70
both halves of the bifurcated decision. Justices Thomas and Alito
joined the first half of the opinion, to create a five-Justice majority
(Majority A), while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
joined the second half to create a separate seven-Justice majority
71
(Majority B).

65. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113, 116–26 (upholding the
endangerment finding).
66. Id.
67. See generally Energy, Climate Change, and Our President, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
68. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2455 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I believed Massachusetts v.
EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaws with that
decision.”).
69. Pidot, supra note 9.
70. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2432.
71. Id.
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The first half of the opinion (Parts I, II–A, and II–B–1) begins
with some background on Clean Air Act stationary source permitting
and the history of EPA’s greenhouse gas regulation. This half
addresses two legal questions. First, in a discussion modeled on the
72
traditional Chevron step one, the Court asked whether the Clean Air
Act’s unambiguous language compels EPA to conclude that
greenhouse-gas regulation under the Tailpipe Program automatically
triggers the PSD Program with respect to major stationary sources of
those gases—a linkage that the Court termed a “greenhouse-gas73
inclusive interpretation.” Second, the Court asked a question that
74
more closely resembles the traditional Chevron step two : if the Act
does not unambiguously compel a greenhouse-gas-inclusive
75
interpretation, does the Act’s “ambiguous . . . text” nevertheless
leave interpretive room for the agency to adopt such an
interpretation? Majority A answered both questions in the negative.
1. Part II-A-1
On the first question, Majority A concluded that although the Act
requires PSD permits for “major emitters of ‘any air pollutant,’” and
(under Massachusetts) the “general, Act-wide definition” of the term
76
“‘air pollutant’ includes greenhouse gases,” the statutory language is
nevertheless sufficiently broad, and the various pollution control
programs sufficiently varied, to permit the agency to adopt a narrower
77
definition of “air pollutant” for some programs than for others. As
Justice Scalia explained, “the presumption of consistent usage [of a
term in a statute] ‘readily yields’ to context, and a statutory term—
even one defined in the statute—‘may take on distinct characters
72. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 54, 52
(2011) (describing the first step of the traditional two-step analysis under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), as requiring the Court to “ask
whether Congress has ‘directly addressed the precise question at issue’”).
73. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439–42 (Part II-A-1).
74. See, e.g., Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 54 (describing the second step of the Chevron test
as requiring the Court to leave in place “an agency rule unless it is ‘arbitrary or capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute’”).
75. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
76. Id. at 2439 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 7479(1) (West 2014) (defining “major emitting
facility”)).
77. Id. at 2442 (“In sum, there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting ‘any
air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers of PSD . . . to encompass only pollutants emitted in
quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude
those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that
their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as
written.”)
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from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different
78
implementation strategies.’”
Thus, in Majority A’s view, the Clean Air Act does not compel
EPA to adopt a greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation. Rather, the
Act allows for the possibility that even after EPA regulates a
particular kind of pollutant under the Tailpipe Program, major
stationary sources of that pollutant may nevertheless escape
regulation under the PSD program. Put more simply, Majority A
decoupled the Tailpipe and PSD Programs for greenhouse gases. The
fact that tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases are regulated under
the Tailpipe Program does not automatically obligate all major
stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain PSD permits.
2. Part II-A-2
On the second question, Majority A went one step further and
concluded that in fact, the language and structure of the Act not only
do not require the EPA to adopt a fully greenhouse gas-inclusive
interpretation, but do not permit EPA to adopt that interpretation.
This portion of the opinion focused on the problem EPA had tried to
resolve with its Tailoring Rule—the mismatch between the low PSD
triggering thresholds and the high levels of many sources’ greenhouse
gas emissions. Majority A noted the impossibility of extending the
PSD permitting program to all “major” stationary sources whose
greenhouse gas emissions exceed the statutory thresholds: such an
extension would “place plainly excessive demands on limited
governmental [permitting] resources” and “bring about an enormous
79
and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority.” And
Majority A found no “clear congressional authorization” to adopt
80
such a costly and “expansive” interpretation.
3. Part II-A-3
Finally—and somewhat surprisingly given the narrow grant of
certiorari—Majority A turned its attention to the Tailoring Rule and
conducted a third statutory-interpretation exercise. Specifically,
Justice Scalia explained that the agency had no room to solve the
problem of statutory fit by “tailoring” the PSD Program’s statutory
thresholds. Those numerical thresholds are clear and unambiguous;
78. Id. at 2441 (quoting Envt’l. Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007)).
79. Id. at 2444.
80. Id.
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“[w]hen EPA replaced [them] with others of its own choosing, it went
81
well beyond the ‘bounds of its statutory authority.’”
To summarize, three holdings emerge from the first half of the
UARG opinion. First, the Clean Air Act does not require application
of the PSD Program to all sources whose emissions of pollutants
regulated under the Tailpipe Program exceed the PSD triggering
thresholds. Second, the Act does not permit application of the full
PSD Program to pollutants like greenhouse gases, which are
commonly emitted at levels vastly exceeding the PSD triggering
thresholds. Third, the Act expressly prohibits EPA from tailoring the
PSD Program in the manner the agency had tried—by exempting less
significant sources of such pollutants.
The only question remaining for resolution was whether, despite
Majority A’s conclusions, EPA nevertheless had authority to tailor the
PSD Program in some other way. That is, although the Clean Air Act
does not permit EPA to rewrite the PSD Program’s quantitative
triggering thresholds for major stationary sources, can the agency
nevertheless apply the Program’s emissions-control requirements to
some otherwise-defined subset of stationary sources of greenhouse
gas?
4. Part II-A-3
In the second half of Justice Scalia’s opinion, Majority B accepted
82
a line of argument from EPA’s merits brief and sided with the agency
on this final question. Per Majority A, stationary sources need not
obtain PSD permits merely because they emit greenhouse gases at
levels above the PSD triggering thresholds; but those sources that
must obtain PSD permits because of their threshold-exceeding
emissions of other, conventional pollutants—so-called “anyway
83
sources” —must also ensure that their greenhouse gas emissions
84
satisfy the PSD Program’s strict emissions control requirements.
Thus, while EPA lacks authority to modify the PSD triggers, it has
ample authority to require that sources already within the PSD
Program because of their emissions of other pollutants take on the
81. Id. at 2445 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)).
82. Federal Opposition Brief, supra note 62 at 24–28, (arguing that “the PSD program’s
substantive requirements . . . apply to greenhouse-gas emissions from stationary sources that are
covered by the program, including sources that are subject to the program because of their nongreenhouse-gas . . . emissions”).
83. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2437 (defining “anyway sources”).
84. Id. at 2448–49 (outlining the holding with respect to “anyway sources”).
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D. “EPA [got] almost everything it wanted”
The strange bifurcated nature of the UARG opinion accounts for
Justice Scalia’s characterization of the decision from the bench: “‘EPA
86
[got] almost everything it wanted.’” “‘[The agency] sought to
regulate sources it said were responsible for 86 percent of all the
87
greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources nationwide’” —
namely, those sources whose greenhouse gas emissions exceed the
Tailoring Rule’s modified triggering thresholds. Majority A stripped
the agency of that authority by striking down the Tailoring Rule. But
Majority B came to the agency’s rescue, upholding the agency’s
authority “to regulate sources responsible for 83 percent of those
88
emissions’” —namely, those “anyway sources” whose emissions of
more conventional pollutants already obligate them to comply with
89
PSD permitting requirements.
A close reading of the agency’s Tailoring Rule suggests that it
would have been more accurate for the Court to assert that EPA
sought to regulate sources responsible for 86 percent of the
greenhouse gas emissions from “major” stationary sources, while
under the Court’s opinion, the agency remains able to regulate 83
90
percent of those emissions. Even with that correction, however, it

85. Id.
86. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA Can Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, with
Some Limits, WASH. POST, June 23, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supremecourt-limits-epas-ability-to-regulate-greenhouse-gas-emissions/2014/06/23/c56fc194-f1b1-11e3914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html (quoting Justice Scalia’s bench statement).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The Court also mentions the 83 percent estimates in its opinion. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at
2438–39 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (No. 12-1146)
(“The Solicitor General . . . informs us that ‘anyway’ sources account for roughly 83% of
American stationary-source greenhouse-gas emissions, compared to just 3% for the additional,
non-“anyway” sources EPA sought to regulate at Steps 2 and 3 of the Tailoring Rule.”).
90. It is difficult to pin down the original source of the 86 percent and 83 percent figures,
but they seem to derive from EPA’s Tailoring Rule, in which the agency asserted that “anyway
sources” “account for approximately 65 percent of total national stationary source GHG
emissions,” while sources covered by the adjusted triggering thresholds of the first two phases of
the Tailoring Rule would “account for approximately 67 percent of total national stationary
source GHG emissions.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,568, 31571. Sources covered by the statutory
triggering thresholds account for 78 percent of total national stationary source GHG emissions.
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,600 (indicating that sources included under the statutory triggering thresholds
but excluded under the adjusted thresholds of the first two phases of the rule “comprise only 11
percent of total stationary source GHG emissions”). That leaves fully 22 percent of stationary
source GHG emissions unregulated under even the statutory triggering thresholds. Using these

LEITER 6.1.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/6/2015 9:06 AM

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP V. EPA: A SHOT ACROSS THE BOW

75

91

remains true that EPA is now able to regulate almost “97% of the
[greenhouse gas] emissions the [a]gency had proposed to control
92
under the . . . Tailoring Rule.” This plainly amounts to a significant
victory for an agency whose authority to regulate greenhouse gases
from either mobile or stationary sources was in doubt as recently as
93
2007.
III. BUT A SIGNIFICANT LOSS FOR THE COURT AND A BLOW TO
AGENCY DEFERENCE
It would be wrong, however, to view the opinion as a true “win”
for EPA, because Majority A’s statutory analysis suggests that those
five Justices have a cramped view of familiar deference doctrines.
Moreover, the opinion is analytically muddled and takes several steps
that run afoul of traditional notions of judicial restraint. Thus, while I
welcome the UARG holding, the opinion itself is cause for concern
rather than jubilation.
The following discussion identifies flaws in each section of the
opinion, labeled to assist the reader in cross-referencing with the
descriptions provided above.
A. Part II-A-1
The opinion brings further confusion to debates over techniques
of statutory interpretation. As noted above, the central statutory issue
in the case concerned the proper interpretation of the PSD triggering
language in the Clean Air Act. After careful analysis of that language,
the D.C. Circuit had concluded that the Act unambiguously extends
PSD coverage to major emitters of greenhouse gases (or of any other
94
pollutants already regulated under other Clean Air Act programs).
The lower court reached that interpretation in part because Congress
used the word “any” in defining which stationary sources must obtain
PSD permits: new or modified stationary sources “which emit, or have

figures, one can calculate that in the first two phases of the Tailoring Rule, EPA sought to
regulate sources responsible for (67/78) or 86 percent of the national stationary source GHG
emissions that could potentially be covered under the PSD Program, while under the Court’s
opinion, the agency remains able to regulate (65/78) or 83 percent of those emissions.
91. That is, (0.83/0.86) or 96.5 percent.
92. Matthew R. Oakes, Questioning the Use of Structure to Interpret Statutory Intent: A
Critique of Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 124 YALE L.J. F. 56, 56–57 (2014), available at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/OakesForum_8i6dupxe.pdf.
93. That is, prior to the issuance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
94. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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the potential to emit” either 250 or 100 tons per year of “any air
95
pollutant.” “On its face,” the D.C. Circuit explained, “the word ‘any’
has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of
whatever kind,’ . . . Congress’s use of the broad, indiscriminate
modifier ‘any’ thus strongly suggests that the phrase ‘any air pollutant’
96
encompasses greenhouse gases.”
Given that Justice Scalia regularly emphasizes the importance of
97
focusing on statutory text, and other members of Majority A are also
98
committed textualists, Majority A might have been expected
likewise to wrestle with the meaning of the word “any” in the phrase
“any air pollutant.” Instead, the first half of the UARG opinion
focuses not on the PSD triggering language but on other indicia of
statutory meaning. For example, Majority A observed that other
portions of the Act use the term “‘air pollutant’ where what is meant
is obviously narrower than the Act-wide definition,” and further, that
EPA itself applies a narrowed definition of “any air pollutant” in
99
administering some air pollution control programs. From these few
atextual indicia, the Court concluded that the statute does not
100
unambiguously compel a greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation.
That is, the Act allows for the possibility that EPA could employ some
101
limiting principle—as yet undetermined —to restrict the reach of the
PSD Program to “pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to
102
be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds.”

95. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7479(1) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
96. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 134 (quoting United States v. Gonzales,
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97
(1976))).
97. See, e.g., Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559
U.S. 280, 302 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (observing that
statutory text is “the only remnant of ‘history’ that bears the unanimous endorsement of the
majority in each House”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 9–10 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia’s view that judges
must be tightly constrained by text or they will read their own values into congressional
enactments).
98. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1887
(2008) (“[I]t appears that several Justices—clearly Justices Scalia and Thomas, and perhaps
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy . . . now consider themselves
textualists.”); id. at 1887 n.14 (collecting cites to support this proposition).
99. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2440–41.
100. See id. at 2439.
101. Id. at 2442 n.6 (“During the course of this litigation, several possible limiting
constructions for the PSD trigger have been proposed. . . . We do not foreclose EPA or the
courts from considering those constructions in the future, but we need not do so today.”).
102. Id. at 2442.
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The determination that the Clean Air Act language does not
unambiguously require a fully greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation
may well be the soundest purposivist reading of the statutory
language defining that Program. After all, as EPA itself acknowledges,
applying the literal terms of the PSD triggering provisions to all
greenhouse gas sources that meet the statutory definition of “major”
would produce “a volume of permit applications” so high that the
“permitting processes would become overwhelmed and essentially
103
paralyzed.” The Program must be limited in its application to
greenhouse gases if is to function at all. Yet it is striking that the
committed textualists in Majority A reached this outcome in spite of,
rather than because of, the statutory text. Indeed, Justice Scalia
effectively acknowledged as much when he concluded his Chevron
step one interpretation of the PSD triggering language by citing FDA
104
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, arguably the most
105
atextual of the Court’s past opinions.
B. Part II-A-2
Majority A did offer a plausible explanation for its choice to
abandon the Clean Air Act’s text: that text is “not conducive to
clarity,” and is “far from a chef d’oeuvre of legislative
106
draftsmanship.” The opinion’s next analytic moves, however, are less
readily explained.
Having concluded at Chevron step one that despite its express
language, the Clean Air Act does not compel EPA to regulate “any”
air pollutant under the PSD Program, Majority A then decided (at
Chevron step two) that the Act also precludes application of the full
PSD Program to all major stationary sources of greenhouse gases.
This portion of the Court’s analysis is deeply flawed because the
Court adopted a questionable interpretive presumption—in effect,
almost a plain-statement rule—under which Congress must “speak
clearly” if it intends to delegate expansive authority to an agency to

103. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71).
104. 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). See also UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014).
105. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 225–26 & n.24 (describing Brown & Williamson as “extraordinary,” and—if
“viewed as a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation”—“puzzling,” “an idiosyncratic
departure from the Court's usual assumptions,” and “an aberrational abandonment of
textualism”).
106. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2441 (emphasis in original).
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issue expensive regulations:
EPA’s [greenhouse gas-inclusive] interpretation is also
unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and
transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without
clear congressional authorization. When an agency claims to
discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate
“a significant portion of the American economy,” . . . we typically
greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect
Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency
107
decisions of vast “economic and political significance.”

This newfound skepticism for broad delegations of power is quite
troubling, as there is no objective measure whereby courts can
identify overly expansive delegations. Numerous statutory programs
require agencies to promulgate expansive and expensive regulations;
are all such programs now suspect? Moreover, no such plainstatement rule previously existed. Indeed the presumption has always
been the reverse: agency authority is at its apex when statutory
language is ambiguous, not when it is plain. The UARG Court’s
alternative formulation means that judicial authority is at its apex
when statutory language is ambiguous, because it is now up to the
courts to decide, one statutory program at a time, whether a particular
delegation to an agency is too expansive or too expensive, and in turn,
whether Congress’s delegation of the relevant authority is sufficiently
clear to satisfy the UARG presumption.
The Brown & Williamson Court wrestled with similar concerns
about overly expansive delegation, but in that opinion the Court was
more careful to ensure that its holding would not swallow the
background principle of deference to agency expertise. That case
concerned the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) effort to assert
regulatory authority over tobacco products. The Court declined to
defer to FDA’s “expansive construction” of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, which would enable the agency to wield too much
power over “an industry constituting a significant portion of the
108
American economy.” Instead, the Court determined, “based on the
[Act’s] overall regulatory scheme and the subsequent tobacco
legislation, that Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the question at
109
issue and precluded the FDA from regulating” such products. In
107. Id. at 2444 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159) (emphasis added).
108. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
109. Id. at 160–61.
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other words, the Brown & Williamson majority quite deliberately
confined itself to a Chevron step one analysis. In its view, Congress’s
intent was clear: there was no delegation to the FDA to regulate
tobacco products.
In
contrast, in
UARG, the
Court
undertook
its
expensive/expansive analysis at step two of Chevron, having already
concluded at step one that the relevant Clean Air Act language is
ambiguous. This distinction between UARG and Brown & Williamson
may seem to be little more than a technicality, but in fact it is highly
significant. A court’s inquiry is meant to be de novo and searching at
step one but highly deferential at step two. Majority A’s willingness to
import concerns about the expansiveness and expensiveness of
Congress’s delegation into the deferential step-two analysis suggests
that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito may no longer be satisfied by any reasonable agency reading of
ambiguous statutory language. Instead, Majority A seems to indicate
that even once a court has determined that congressional intent is
ambiguous, the court should define for itself the plausible limits of
Congress’s delegation—presumably by consulting the judges’ own
views of the appropriate cost and scope of executive action. In this
cramped view of Chevron deference, courts would defer to agencies’
superior expertise only when (1) congressional intent is ambiguous,
(2) the delegation does not offend the court’s sense of the proper
scope of agency authority, and (3) the agency’s action is reasonable
within that judicially—rather than legislatively—delimited scope.
C. Parts II-A-3 and II-B-2
Finally, the last two significant parts of the UARG opinion,
striking down the Tailoring Rule and then upholding application of
the PSD Program to “anyway” sources, raise their own set of
concerns.
First, although its interpretation of the PSD triggering language
effectively released the agency from the statutory bind that made the
Tailoring Rule necessary, Majority A nevertheless went ahead with its
review (and rejection) of that Rule. EPA explained at length in the
Tailoring Rule preamble that the agency chose to adopt modified
triggering thresholds because “the costs to sources and administrative
burdens to permitting authorities that would result from application
of the PSD [Program] at the statutory levels” would lead to “‘absurd
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results.’’’ The agency concluded that Congress “could not have
intended that the PSD . . . threshold levels . . . apply literally” to
111
stationary sources of greenhouse gases, and the agency “[t]herefore”
temporarily “tailored” those thresholds.
The Court’s determination that the Clean Air Act does not compel
application of the PSD Program to all major stationary sources of
greenhouse gases effectively rendered the Tailoring Rule unnecessary
and opened up the possibility that EPA could identify some other, less
112
legally-vulnerable principle to limit the Program’s reach. Separation
of powers principles would suggest that the proper outcome at that
point was a remand from the inexpert and unaccountable court to the
more detail-oriented, expert, and democratically-accountable
113
agency: “EPA, your awkward approach in the Tailoring Rule is no
longer necessary; go back to the drawing boards and identify a more
defensible limiting principle to improve the function of the PSD
Program.”
Yet the Court declined to take that more cautious—and more
respectful—approach. Instead, in Part II-A-3, Majority A reviewed
114
the (now unnecessary) Tailoring Rule and struck it down; and in
Part II-B-2, Majority B proceeded to assess—and, indeed, enshrine as
115
mandated by the Clean Air Act —the alternative approach,
110. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,517 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71).
111. Id.
112. The Court effectively acknowledged that point when it reassured the agency that its
opinion does not “foreclose EPA . . . from considering . . . possible limiting constructions for the
PSD trigger . . . in the future.” UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442 n.6.
113. For Example:
Compared with judicial lawmaking, agency lawmaking has much to recommend it.
First, it can make the rule of law more predictable: agencies can flesh out statutory
standards with detailed rulemaking, and their rules have immediate national
application, unlike the slower process of circuit-by-circuit adjudication by federal
courts. Second, agencies have access to experts and deep experience in applying the
statutes they are charged with enforcing. Hence, they often make better policy choices
than either judges or legislators. For me, agencies are particularly attractive, because
they can update statutes more rapidly and often more effectively than judges can.
Third, agencies are typically more democratically accountable than judges. Their
dynamic applications of statutes are subject to congressional oversight and budget
pressures and are thus more likely to reflect current legislative preferences than
judicial dynamism.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2057 (2006) (reviewing
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)).
114. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444–46.
115. See id. at 2448 (describing the pollution control language of the PSD Program as
“clear” and not “readily susceptible [of] misinterpretation,” and concluding that nothing in the
Act “suggest[s] that the BACT provision can bear a narrowing construction”).
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suggested not in any agency rule but in the agency’s merits brief, of
requiring that “anyway sources” already in the PSD Program
undertake measures to control not just their emissions of
117
conventional pollutants but also their greenhouse gas emissions. In
short, rather than simply assisting EPA out of its legislative bind and
then leaving the agency to conduct a rulemaking and devise an
appropriate PSD limiting principle, the Court first struck down the
Tailoring Rule and then began the process of devising a judicial
alternative.
Worse, in reviewing and striking down the Tailoring Rule, Majority
A squarely answered a question on which the Court had denied
118
certiorari: whether the Tailoring Rule was lawful.
Several parties
119
had pressed the Court to entertain that question, but the Court
declined, instead fashioning its own, far narrower Question Presented.
Relying on that narrow grant of certiorari, the Respondents’ brief did
120
not address the lawfulness of the Tailoring Rule. Yet the Court took
on the issue—and resolved it in favor of Petitioners—without the
benefit of Respondents’ arguments.

116. Federal Opposition Brief, supra note 62, at 24–28 (arguing that “the PSD program’s
substantive requirements . . . apply to greenhouse-gas emissions from stationary sources that are
covered by the program, including sources that are subject to the program because of their nongreenhouse-gas . . . emissions”).
117. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448–49.
118. In fact, answering this question also forced the Court to resolve, if not satisfactorily
address, a second question on which it had denied certiorari: Whether the Petitioners had
standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule in the first place. See generally, e.g., Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (noting that standing is
“normally . . . considered a threshold question” that implicates the Court’s “jurisdiction to
entertain” the suit and therefore “must be resolved in respondent's favor before proceeding to
the merits”).
In UARG, the Court did not bother with a true standing analysis, instead reasoning its way
as follows: “Since the Court of Appeals thought the statute unambiguously made greenhouse
gases capable of triggering PSD and Title V, it held that petitioners lacked Article III standing
to challenge the Tailoring Rule because that rule did not injure petitioners but merely relaxed
the pre-existing statutory requirements. Because we, however, hold that EPA’s greenhouse-gasinclusive interpretation of the triggers was not compelled, and because EPA has essentially
admitted that its interpretation would be unreasonable without ‘tailoring,’ we consider the
validity of the Tailoring Rule.” UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445.
119. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
120. Federal Opposition Brief at 17 supra note 62, at 1, 7& nn.4, 9 (mentioning the
Tailoring Rule only three times, in the background section of the brief). The brief also bypassed
Petitioners’ standing to challenge that Rule. Id. at 20 (mentioning standing only once, in a
description of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion).
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CONCLUSION
Complicated statutory and regulatory tangles like the one in
UARG pose a real challenge for courts. They must work to
understand Congress’s purposes, the agency’s role, and the facts on
the ground; to predict the consequences of any judicial or
administrative intervention in the status quo; to pay adequate heed to
interpretive rules and deference doctrines; and to draft an opinion
that satisfies a majority of the judges hearing the case. These myriad
challenges go a long way toward explaining the UARG Court’s
evident confusion and frustration, and the somewhat tortured nature
of the resulting opinion.
The right solution in the face of such statutory and regulatory
complexity, however, is not for the Court to muddle through, leaving
confusion and jurisprudential detritus in their wake, but to hew
closely to traditional deference principles. Here, having solved EPA’s
statutory conundrum by decoupling the Tailpipe and PSD Programs,
the Court should have remanded for EPA to sort out the resulting
mess and adopt a workable solution. Even if EPA had adopted the
same approach that Majority B identified—regulation of greenhouse
emissions from “anyway” sources—that approach would have had
greater substantive, procedural, and democratic legitimacy had it been
developed in the first instance in a public rulemaking.

